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Abstract
We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a country
consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions, each comprising two
districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local
public goods have positive spillover effects on the neighbouring district,
there is underprovision of public goods in both the city and the village.
When districts unite, underprovision persists in the village (and may even
become more severe), whereas overprovision of public goods arises in the
city as urbanites use their political power to exploit the villagers. From
a social welfare point of view, inhabitants of the village have insufficient
incentives to vote for unification. We examine how national transfers to
local governments can resolve these problems.
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1 Introduction
Inhabitants of villages that are located close by a city usually benefit considerably
from the services provided by the city. Many villagers work in the city. Moreover,
they often find the city a good place to spend their leisure time. In as far as public
services are concerned, the costs of services provided by the city are commonly
completely borne by the inhabitants of the city. As inhabitants of cities usually
benefit to a much smaller extent from the services provided in villages than
villagers benefit from cities’ services, representatives of cities have claimed that
the distribution of the tax burden is unfair. Moreover, the interjurisdictional
spillover effects of public good provision may give rise to severe underprovision as
voters in the city do not take into account the benefits of the city’s public good
provision on the welfare of the villagers. The same holds for the public good
provision in the village in as far as urbanites benefit from public good provision
in the village.
A natural policy response to these problems is to unify cities and villages.
Unsurprisingly, inhabitants of villages often fiercely oppose unification as it entails
a large tax increase. Villagers claim that the only goal of unification is to relieve
the financial problems of the city. Moreover, they fear that their interests will
be ignored because they constitute a minority in political decision-making bodies
after unification. Consequently, public good provision in the village may be
reduced. When villagers have the right to decide on whether to unite with a city
or not, unification will therefore be a rare event.
This paper studies how national transfers to local governments can resolve
these problems. We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in
a country consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions. Each region
consists of two districts that differ in size, a city and a village. The city and
the village either form one municipality or they remain autonomous. We as-
sume that unification requires the consent of a majority of voters in both the city
and in the village. In line with earlier studies, we find that when districts re-
main autonomous, there is underprovision of local public goods in both districts.
Underprovision of public goods in the village persists after unification, and may
even become more severe. In the city, unification results in overprovision of public
goods, as the urbanites start exploiting the villagers. Lastly, our model implies
that from a social welfare point of view, voters in the village have insufficient
incentives to vote for unification.
We consider the effects of two types of national transfers: an earmarked trans-
fer that increases with local public good provision and a lump-sum transfer to mu-
nicipalities that is independent of population size. An earmarked subsidy helps to
mitigate the underprovision problem. A lump-sum tax strengthens the incentives
for unification. Heterogeneity between regions causes neither of these transfers
to attain the first-best. Earmarked transfers promote welfare as they increase
public goods provision in autonomous districts, but exacerbate the problem of
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overprovision of public goods in cities that merged with a village. Moreover, even
when all districts remain autonomous, differences in the size of the spillover ef-
fect between regions cause earmarked transfers to result in overprovision in some
regions, while underprovision persists in other regions. A lump-sum tax that is
independent of population size promotes unification in regions where it is socially
desirable, but also in regions where districts can better remain autonomous. The
optimal lump-sum transfer as well as the optimal earmarked transfer entail a
trade off between these desired and undesired effects and crucially depend on the
exact distribution of relative population sizes and spillover effects over regions.
Transfers from national governments to local governments are widespread.
For instance, in The Netherlands, about 7% of the national government bud-
get is transferred to local governments through the ’Gemeentefonds’. Parts of
these transfers are earmarked. In Germany, the ’Gemeindefinanzierungsgesetz’
arranges the transfers from the ’Länder’ to the ’Kommunen’. In Sweden, lo-
cal governments receive general grants and equalization grants from the ’staten’.
In the US, towns receive intergovernmental grants from the federal government,
from the state, and from the county.
The economics literature gives little attention to the effect of transfers on
incentives for unification.1 One reason is that most papers on political geography
focus on formation of countries rather than on unification of local jurisdictions.
Related to the present paper are Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Bolton and Roland
(1996, 1997), and Goyal and Staal (2003).2 In contrast to the present analysis,
these papers assume that centralized policy is uniform. Our set-up is close to
Besley and Coate (1999), who study the merits of centralized provision of local
public goods when provision need not be uniform across jurisdictions. The main
differences between our paper and theirs is that we endogenize the decision on
centralization and that we allow for transfers from a higher-level government.
Three other papers are close to our analysis. First, Calabrese, Cassidy, and
Epple (2002) develop a computational model to study the effects of and political
support for municipal consolidation. Their main focus is on local redistributive
policies and housing prices. Ellingsen (1998) studies the effects of inter- and intra-
regional heterogeneity in preferences and the relative size of regions on political
integration. Heterogeneity in preferences between regions also plays a key role
in Lockwood (2002). None of these papers examines the role of transfers from a
national government.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Next, in
section 3.1, we derive the socially optimal amounts of local public goods. Section
3.2 examines the outcome of voting on public good provision, when districts are
1There is, however, a large literature on intergovernmental transfers where jurisdictional
boundaries are taken as given, most prominently Oates (1972), Gordon (1983), Persson and
Tabellini (1996), and Dixit and Londregan (1998). For a survey, see Oates (1999).
2For a survey of the literature on the size of countries, see Bolton, Roland and Spolaore
(1996).
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autonomous and when they are united. Section 3.3 derives the conditions under
which districts decide to unite. In section 3.4, these conditions are compared with
the conditions for socially optimal unification. Section 4 examines the effects of
national transfers to municipalities. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a country consisting of many regions. Each region consists of two dis-
tricts (cities, villages). Districts in a region differ from each other in population
size; otherwise they are identical. The population size of district i in region j is
denoted by αij. Inhabitants of a district are homogenous and immobile.
Districts in a region either form one municipality or two separate municipali-
ties. Forming one municipality requires majority support in each of the districts.
A municipality is responsible for the provision of local pure public goods. Deci-
sions on public goods provision are taken by majority rule. The amount of public
goods provided in district i in region j is denoted by gij. Public goods provided
in a district have positive spillover effects on the other district in the region. The
utility function of an inhabitant of district i in region j is:
Uij =
√gij + κ
√g−ij + y − tij (1)
where g−ij is the amount of public goods provided in the other district in region
j, the parameter κ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of spillovers, y is before-tax
private income per capita, and tij is a local lump-sum tax. Note that we abstract
from income heterogeneity. Further, we assume that public goods and private
goods are separable in the utility function and that taxes are nondistortionary.
A convenient implication is that we can omit y. We will discuss some of the
consequences of these assumptions along the way and in the concluding section.
The cost of a public good is equal to p units of private goods. Public goods
are financed by local lump-sum taxes, tij, and by transfers from the central gov-
ernment to the local governments, f(·). The latter may depend on, e.g., the
population size of the municipality and on the amount of public goods provided.
If districts in region j are two separate municipalities, the local government’s
budget constraint reads:
pgij = f (·) + tijαij (2)
If districts in region j form one municipality, the budget constraint is:
p (gij + g−ij) = f (·) + tj (αij + α−ij) (3)
Note that we impose the condition that the per capita taxes within a municipality
are uniform across districts.
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3 Local public good provision and unification of
municipalities
We structure our analysis as follows. First, we derive the socially optimal levels
of local public goods. Next, we analyze political decision making and contrast the
outcomes with the normative benchmark. The political decision making process
consists of two stages. First, voters in each district vote on whether to unite
with the neighboring district into one municipality or to remain autonomous.
Next, there is a vote on the amount(s) of public goods in each municipality. For
the moment, we abstract from central funding, f(·) = 0. In section 4, we study
national transfers aimed at improving the allocative efficiency of local public good
provision in heterogenous regions. Since we abstract from interregional spillovers,
and inhabitants are immobile, we restrict attention in this section to public goods
provision and unification of municipalities in a particular region. For convenience,
we drop the subscript j, and we denote the larger district in the region as the
city (c) and the smaller district as the village (v), αc > αv.
3.1 Social optimum
We define the social optimum as the outcome that maximizes the unweighted
sum of utilities of all individuals in the region:
max
gc,gv
αc (
√gc + κ
√gv) + αv (
√gv + κ
√gc)− pgc − pgv (4)
The social surplus maximizing public good levels (gsc , gsv) that result from this
optimization problem are:
gsc =
µ
αc + καv
2p
¶2
(5)
gsv =
µ
αv + καc
2p
¶2
(6)
Hence, the socially optimal amount of public goods in each district increases in
the population size of both districts, increases in the size of the spillover effect,
and decreases in the cost of public goods provision.
3.2 Voting on public goods provision
First consider the case where districts remain autonomous. Recall that voters are
homogenous within districts. Hence, the outcome of voting in district i is found
by maximizing (1) with respect to gi subject to the budget constraint (2). The
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equilibrium levels of public goods (gac , gav) are:
gac =
µ
αc
2p
¶2
(7)
gav =
µ
αv
2p
¶2
(8)
Clearly, local public goods are underprovided when districts are autonomous
[compare (7) and (8) with (5) and (6), respectively]. The reason is that voters in
each district do not take into account the positive spillover effect of public goods
on welfare in the other district. Underprovision is more severe for larger spillover
effects and for a larger population size of the neighboring district.
When districts unite into one municipality, the inhabitants of the city are in a
majority and, therefore, gc and gv are set according to their wishes. Maximizing
(1) with respect to gc and gv subject to the budget constraint (3) results in:
guc =
µ
αc + αv
2p
¶2
(9)
guv =
µ
κ (αc + αv)
2p
¶2
(10)
Unification results in overprovision of public goods in the city, whereas underpro-
vision of public goods in the village persists and may become even more severe
than under autonomy [compare (9) and (10) with (5) and (6) and with (7) and (8),
respectively]. The intuition is clear. Unification broadens the tax base. Hence,
the per capita tax per unit of public good is lower. This induces inhabitants of
the city (the decisive voters) to increase the amount of public goods provided in
their district. Since they do not take into account the tax cost to the inhabitants
of the village, and the villagers benefit less from public goods provided in the
city than the urbanites, public goods provision in the city is higher than socially
optimal. The effect of unification on the amount of public goods provided in the
village is ambiguous. On the one hand, the per capita tax per unit of public
good decreases, resulting in an increase in the amount of public goods provided.
This effect is larger for a larger population size of the city. On the other hand,
it is the urbanites, not the villagers, who decide on public goods provision after
unification. This reduces the amount of public goods provided in the village as
urbanites care less about the public goods in the village than do the villagers.
This effect is larger for a smaller spillover effect. Comparing (10) with (8), it
follows that unification increases public goods supply in the village if κ > αvαc+αv .
Hence, public goods supply in the village increases if the spillover effect or the
relative population size of the city is sufficiently large. Since αv < αc, κ ≥ 12
is a sufficient condition. In all cases, underprovision of public goods persists in
the village as inhabitants of the city care less than the inhabitants of the village
about public goods supply in the village [compare (10) with (6)].
6
Lastly, it is easily verified that the per capita tax is always higher when
districts unite than when they remain autonomous and - in the latter case - that
the tax in the city is higher than the tax in the village:
tuv = tuc =
¡
1 + κ2
¢ αc + αv
4p > t
a
c =
αc
4p > t
a
v =
αv
4p
Clearly, when public and private goods would not be separable in the utility
function, this need not be the case because income effects come into play.
3.3 Voting on unification of municipalities
In each district, there is a vote on whether to unite with the neighboring dis-
trict into one municipality or to remain autonomous. Using the results from the
previous subsection, urbanites favor unification if:¡
1 + κ2
¢ αc + αv
2p >
αc
4p + κ
αv
2p
Unsurprisingly, this condition is always satisfied. Unification benefits the inhabi-
tants of the city as it brings about a broader tax base and the right to decide on
the level of gv. Villagers favor unification if:¡
4κ− κ2 − 1
¢ αc + αv
4p >
αv
4p + κ
αc
2p
Rewriting yields: ¡
4κ− κ2 − 2
¢
αv >
¡
1 + κ2 − 2κ
¢
αc (11)
The right-hand side is positive for all values of κ between zero and unity. The
left-hand side is negative when κ ∈ [0, 2−
√
2). Hence, when the spillover effect
is small, villagers oppose unification for any values of αv and αc. For κ > 2−
√
2,
we can write the condition as:
αv
αc
> 1 + κ
2 − 2κ
4κ− κ2 − 2 (12)
This condition is depicted in Figure 1.
[FIGURE 1]
Unification can only be in the villager’s interest if κ > 3/2 − 1
2
√
3. The
villagers’ incentive to unite becomes stronger as the spillover effect is larger. The
intuition is clear. After unification, public goods provision reflects the wishes of
the urbanites. When spillovers are small, unification reduces the level of public
goods that are provided in the village while the tax burden increases as villagers
now have to pay for the public goods provided in the city. In addition, when
spillovers are small, villagers benefit little from the increase in public goods supply
in the city. When spillovers are larger, unification may increase public goods
7
provision in the village and villagers benefit to a larger extent from the increase
in public goods provision in the city. If spillovers are sufficiently large, the welfare
gain from the increase in public goods compensates for the increase in the tax.
More surprisingly, provided that κ > 2−
√
2, the incentive to unite increases
in the relative size of the village, while the reverse holds when κ < 2−
√
2. Two
effects, working in opposite directions, play a role.
First, the villagers must pay for the public goods that are provided in the city
when they decide to unite, while they can free ride on the city’s tax payers when
they remain autonomous. The larger is the city’s population size, the larger is the
tax increase for the villagers. A larger population size in the city thus weakens
the incentive to unite. Unification, however, also increases the amount of public
goods provided in the city as it broadens the tax base. This effect increases in the
population size of the village. If κ < 1
2
, the positive effect of higher public good
provision in the city on villagers’ utility does not compensate for the accompanied
increase in the tax burden. Then, a larger population size in the village reduces
the incentive to unite. If κ > 1
2
, the villagers’ benefit from increased public good
provision in the city is larger than the utility loss from the tax increase. Then,
a larger population size in the village makes it more likely that villagers support
unification.
Second, for any value of κ, a higher population size in the city promotes
unification as it becomes more likely that public goods provision in the village
increases. In contrast, the more populous the village, the weaker the incentive
to unite. When the village is large, the level of public goods under autonomy
is already high and, hence, it becomes less likely that unification results in an
increase in public goods provision in the village.
Taking the two effects together, it follows that the incentive to unite decreases
in the relative size of the village when spillovers are small (κ < 2 −
√
2), while
the reverse holds when spillovers are large (κ > 2−
√
2).
3.4 Socially optimal unification
Unification is only in the villagers’ interest when spillovers are large and the
village is not too small relative to the city. An important question is under what
conditions unification brings us closer to the social optimum. In other words,
do villagers have sufficient incentives to vote for unification from a social welfare
point of view? Comparing social welfare under autonomy and unification, we find
that unification raises welfare if:
α2v
¡
2− 4κ+ κ2
¢
− κ2α2c < 0
When κ > 2 −
√
2, the first term is negative and, hence, unification always
increases social welfare. When κ < 2−
√
2, we can write the condition as:
αv
αc
< κ√
2− 4κ+ κ2
(13)
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This condition is depicted in Figure 2, together with the political feasibility con-
straint which we derived in the previous section.
[FIGURE 2]
Unification increases welfare if the spillover effect is sufficiently large. If κ > 1
2
,
unification always increases welfare. A large spillover effect implies that under-
provision is severe under autonomy and makes it more likely that public goods
supply in both the city and the village increase after unification. When the
spillover effect is small, unification only increases aggregate welfare if the village
is small relative to the city. The intuition is straightforward. The smaller the
village, the smaller the increase in the tax base, and hence the less severe the
overprovision of public goods in the city after unification. Moreover, when the
village is small relative to the city, it is more likely that unification increases
public good provision in the village, and hence partly resolves the underprovision
problem in the village. Clearly, villagers’ incentives to vote for unification are
insufficient from a social welfare point of view. The reason is that they do not
take into account the effect of unification on the welfare of the urbanites.
4 National government
The previous section showed that: i) autonomous districts underprovide public
goods; ii) unification does not solve (may even worsen) the problem of underpro-
vision in the smallest district and results in overprovision in the largest district;
iii) voters in the smallest district have insufficient incentives to vote for unifica-
tion from a social welfare point of view. This section examines how the national
government may improve upon the decentralized equilibrium outcome by condi-
tioning national transfers to municipalities on local characteristics. We assume
that the national government can condition transfers to municipalities on pop-
ulation size and on the levels of public goods that are provided. The national
government does not observe the size of the spillover effect in different regions.
If it could condition transfers also on the size of the spillover effect, the national
government could generate any level of public good provision (including first-best
provision in all districts) without creating any distortions. We feel that it is plau-
sible to assume that the national government lacks information about spillover
effects in different regions. We analyze the effects of two types of transfers: i) a
transfer that is conditional on the level of public goods and that must be spent
on public goods (earmarked transfers) and ii) a lump-sum transfer per municipal-
ity. The earmarked transfer helps mitigating the underprovision problem. The
lump-sum transfer affects the incentives for unification and may thus indirectly
increase the allocative efficiency of public goods provision in the economy.
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4.1 Earmarked transfer
The national government gives a transfer of σ per unit of public good provided
in each municipality. The transfer is earmarked: it must be spent on the same
public good that it is conditioned on. The national government finances the
subsidy to local public good provision by means of a national income tax. We
assume that the number of municipalities is sufficiently large, such that a single
municipality’s decisions have a negligible effect on the national tax rate. Hence,
we can safely ignore the national tax in the analysis of local public goods provision
and unification of municipalities.
First consider autonomous districts. Maximizing (1) with respect to gi, sub-
ject to the budget constraint (2), and recognizing that each unit of gi delivers
(1 + σ) gi through the transfer scheme, results in the equilibrium level of public
goods provision:
gai =
µ
(1 + σ)αi
2p
¶2
(14)
Comparing (7) with (14), it follows that the level of public goods increases in
the earmarked transfer. Similarly, when districts unite, public goods provision in
equilibrium is:
guc =
µ
(1 + σ) (αc + αv)
2p
¶2
guv =
µ
(1 + σ)κj (αc + αv)
2p
¶2
It is easily verified that the earmarked transfer does not affect the incentives to
unite. The reason is that the transfer σ increases welfare under the different
regimes equiproportionally. For the same reason, the condition under which uni-
fication is socially optimal is not affected by the level of the earmarked transfer.
Earmarked transfers do not bring about socially optimal public goods pro-
vision for at least two reasons. First, in regions where districts have merged,
earmarked transfers aggravate the problem of overprovision of public goods in
the largest district. Second, when spillover effects differ between regions, a given
level of σ is too low in some regions, while it is too high in others. Hence, under-
provision will persist in some regions, while earmarked transfers cause overprovi-
sion in other regions.3 The optimal level of σ will crucially depend on the exact
distribution of κj’s over regions as well as on the distribution of αvαc over regions.
3Conditioning σ on the population size of municipalities may help, but does not eliminate
these problems because of the differences in κ between regions.
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4.2 Lump-sum transfer
Another, less direct way to enhance allocative efficiency of public goods provision
is to promote unification of districts. As we saw in the previous section, the
villagers have insufficient incentive to unite from a social welfare point of view.
A simple way to strengthen the incentives to unite is to make a lump-sum trans-
fer.4 Suppose the national government provides a lump-sum transfer µ to each
municipality. Villagers favor unification if:¡
4κj − κ2j − 1
¢ αc + αv
4p +
µ
αc + αv
> αv
4p + κj
αc
2p +
µ
αv
Clearly, µ < 0 promotes unification. A lump-sum tax which is equal for all
municipalities makes it more likely that villagers support unification as unification
enables them to share the tax with more people. Just like the earmarked transfer,
the lump-sum transfer is not a distortion-free instrument. Since the national
government does not observe κj, the lump-sum tax is either too low to induce
unification in all cases in which unification is socially desirable, and/or the lump-
sum tax is so high that some small villages have an incentive to unite while it
would be socially optimal to remain autonomous. The optimal lump-sum transfer
entails a trade off between these two effects and will crucially depend on the exact
distribution of κj over regions.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we presented a model to study local public goods provision, endoge-
nous formation of municipalities, and the effects of transfers from higher-level
governments. A well-known result is that decentralized public good provision
leads to underprovision when there are positive spillovers. We have shown that
centralized public good provision may lead to overprovision of local public goods
in the largest district. Moreover, when the spillover benefits are small, central-
ized provision may aggravate underprovision in the smallest district. As a rule,
there are insufficient incentives for unification in the smallest district. A national
government can alleviate above-mentioned problems by implementing a transfer
scheme. We have considered an earmarked transfer, acting upon the amounts
of local public goods provided, and a lump-sum transfer, affecting the incentives
4There exist more sophisticated transfer schemes to manipulate the incentives to unite,
where the transfers depend on the (relative) size of the village. Given that κ is not observed
by the national government, none of them will bring about the social optimum, however. As
for the earmarked transfer, the optimal scheme is dependent of the exact distribution of κ over
regions. We have attempted to derive optimal transfer schemes for specific distributions, but
we either failed to obtain a solution or felt that the solution did not bring much additional
insights.
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for unification. When the national government is not fully informed about lo-
cal preferences, these transfers do not bring about the social optimum. Optimal
transfers depend crucially on the distribution of spillover effects over regions.
Our analysis can be extended in several important ways. Firstly, one could
drop the assumption that individuals are immobile, and introduce a housing
market, as in Calabrese, Cassidy, and Epple (2002). When mobility is costless,
housing prices in market equilibrium will be such that the utility of urbanites
and citizens is equal. The welfare effects of unification of the city and the village
will then be reflected in a change in relative housing prices. We conjecture that
our main results will still hold after this modification. A nice feature of this
extension is that it could yield hypotheses that can be empirically tested using
housing prices before and after unification of municipalities.
Secondly, a threat of secession and the possibility of bargaining between the
municipalities could be introduced in the model. Before unification, the urbanites
and villagers could attempt to agree upon levels of taxation and public goods
provision, which can be different from the unrestricted majority voting outcome.
Compliance might be enforced by the threat of secession by one of the districts.5
It is clear that bargaining would make unification politically feasible for most, if
not all, of the cases where unification is socially optimal. In fact, there would be
no need to unify municipalities, coordinating public good supply would suffice.
As Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) note and anecdotical evidence suggests, however,
the overall record of ‘cooperative federalism’ has not been impressive.
Thirdly, we have restricted our analysis to the issue of what would be a socially
optimal transfer scheme. Obviously, policy makers at the central level who deicide
on the transfers may have other interests, either because they represent mainly
urbanites (or villagers), or because they are responsive to lobbying efforts by
local governments, as in Borck and Owings (2003), or because they can use
intergovernmental grants to win votes in districts with many swing voters, as
in Johansson (1999). It would be interesting to examine the interplay between
political decision making at the central level and at the local level, taking into
account the inefficiencies in local political decision making that we identified in
this paper. Likewise, politicians and voters at the local level may have other
motives for unification than those stressed in our paper. Austin (1999) shows
that the current decisive voter may support unification so as to influence the
indentity of the decisive voter in the future. His empirical analysis suggests that
these political motives may be more important than economic motives. Filer and
Kenny (1980), on the other hand, do find evidence that voters vote in line with
their dollar benefits of unification.
Lastly, the model could be extended so as to capture a number of other fea-
tures that appear to be important in political decision making on unification of
5Le Breton and Weber (2001) have recently developed a model where transfers are used to
prevent secession by regions.
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municipalities and local public good provision, like asymmetric spillovers (urban-
ites usually benefit less from public goods provision in the village than villagers
benefit from the city’s public goods), income heterogeneity, and economies of
scale in public good production. While the latter may imply that inhabitants of
small villages are more favorable to unification than suggested by our analysis,
the former two tend to strengthen the villager’s opposition.
6 Acknowledgements
We thank Ami Glazer, Sanjeev Goyal, Henrik Jordahl, Otto Swank, and partic-
ipants at presentations in Aarhus Universitet (2003 Annual Meeting of the Eu-
ropean Public Choice Society), Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and Duke Uni-
versity (Public Economic Theory 2003 Meeting) for useful comments. Dur grate-
fully acknowledges financial support from NWO, KNAW, and VSNU through a
Vernieuwingsimpuls grant. Staal thanks Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Univer-
siteit Rotterdam for financial assistance.
References
[1] Alesina, A. and E. Spolaore (1997), On the number and size of nations,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1027-1056.
[2] Austin, D.A. (1999), Politics vs economics: Evidence from municipal annex-
ation, Journal of Urban Economics, 45, 501-532.
[3] Besley, T. and S. Coate (1999), Centralized vs. decentralized provision of
local public goods: A political economy analysis, NBER Working paper,
7084.
[4] Bolton, P. and G. Roland (1996), Distributional conflicts, factor mobility
and political integration, American Economic Review, 86, 99-105.
[5] Bolton, P. and G. Roland (1997), The break-up of nations: A political econ-
omy analysis, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1057-1089.
[6] Bolton, P., G. Roland and E. Spolaore (1996), Economic theories of the
break-up and integration of nations, European Economic Review, 40, 697-
705.
[7] Borck, R. and S. Owings (2003), The political economy of intergovernmental
grants, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 33, 139-156.
[8] Calabrese, S., G. Cassidy and D. Epple (2002), Local government fiscal struc-
ture and metropolitan consolidation, in: W.G. Gale and J. Rothenberg Pack
13
(Eds.), Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, (Brookings Institution
Press, Washington, D.C.), 1-32.
[9] Dixit, A. and J. Londregan (1998), Fiscal federalism and redistributive pol-
itics, Journal of Public Economics, 68, 153-180.
[10] Ellingsen, T. (1998), Externalities vs internalities: a model of political inte-
gration, Journal of Public Economics, 68, 251-268.
[11] Filer, J.E. and L.W. Kenny (1980), Voter reaction to city-county consolida-
tion referenda, Journal of Law and Economics, 23, 179-190.
[12] Gordon, R.H. (1983), An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 567-586.
[13] Goyal, S., and K. Staal (2003), The political economy of regionalism, Euro-
pean Economic Review, forthcoming.
[14] Inman, R.P. and D.L. Rubinfeld (1997), Rethinking federalism, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 43-64.
[15] Johansson, E. (1999), Intergovernmental grants as tactical instrument: Some
empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, forthcoming.
[16] Le Breton, M. and S. Weber (2001), The art of making everybody happy:
How to prevent a secession?, IMF Staff Papers, forthcoming.
[17] Lockwood, B. (2002), Distributive politics and the costs of centralization,
Review of Economic Studies, 69, 313-337.
[18] Oates, W.E. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New
York.
[19] Oates, W.E. (1999), An essay on fiscal federalism, Journal of Economic
Literature, 37, 1120-1149.
[20] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1996), Federal fiscal constitutions: risk sharing
and redistribution, Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 979-1009.
14
α v/
α c
1
no
 u
ni
fic
at
io
n
un
ifi
ca
tio
n
1
0
3/
2-
√3
/2
κ
Fi
gu
re
 1
: V
ot
e 
on
 u
ni
fic
at
io
n
α v/
α c
1
no
 u
ni
fic
at
io
n
un
ifi
ca
tio
n
1/
2
3/
2-
√3
/2
un
ifi
ca
tio
n 
is
 so
ci
al
ly
 o
pt
im
al
, 
bu
t n
ot
 p
ol
iti
ca
lly
 fe
as
ib
le
1
0
κ
Fi
gu
re
 2
: S
oc
ia
l o
pt
im
al
ity
 a
nd
 p
ol
iti
ca
l f
ea
si
bi
lit
y
of
 u
ni
fic
at
io
n.
